

# BOOK REVIEWS



***Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower.*** By Dik Alan Daso. Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000. 314 Pages. \$29.95. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingsseed, U.S. Army.

Few officers have had careers more distinguished than that of General of the Air Force Henry "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in World War II. In the first full-length biography based primarily on Arnold's personal papers and recently declassified federal documents, Air Force pilot and author Dik Daso examines the career of the officer whose vision laid the foundation for the technology, infrastructure, and philosophy of today's U.S. Air Force. This current biography is Daso's second contribution toward portraying Arnold as one of the 20th century's greatest military leaders. (The first was *Architects of American Air Supremacy: General Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Karman*, 1997.)

Daso takes more than a traditional biographical approach to a man's life. In his effort to present a fresh look at the life of the Air Force's only five-star general, he focuses on the critical elements of science and technology that so influenced Arnold's life. He offers a provocative parallel that portrays Arnold's story as an evolution and a struggle for the development and acceptance of an air force as a legitimate element of military power. Daso contends that it is his subject's journey through history—not his final destination in history—that offers the most critical insight into the mind of the commander of the most powerful air force ever assembled.

When he graduated from West Point in 1907, Arnold received a commission in the infantry, but his heart was in the cavalry. Four years later he volunteered for the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps. Under the tutelage of Wilbur Wright, Arnold received his pilot's license and embarked on a career that eventually led to the pinnacle of his profession. Although he was destined never to fire a bullet or drop a bomb in combat, Arnold quickly grasped the potential of the airplane and dedicated his career to the advancement of air power.

The interwar years produced disillusion-

ment and declining budgets, but in 1929, Arnold began a decade of command experience, ranging from overseeing distribution of supplies, research and development, air-mail operations, and transcontinental flights. With such vast experience in virtually every aspect of air operations, Arnold also refined his skills as an adroit Washington bureaucrat, increasingly comfortable within both the political and the industrial arenas. In 1935 he received his general's star, taking command of the West Coast Division of the newly constituted General Headquarters, Air Force. Arnold was elevated to Chief of the Army Air Corps three years later and in 1941, became commanding general, Army Air Forces (AAF).

Over the course of World War II, Arnold had every bit as much influence on the conduct of the air war as General George C. Marshall had on the strategic planning of the ground war. His personal intervention to garner congressional support for production of the B-29 bomber and his continual efforts to perfect the AAF organization were his greatest contributions to victory. Ironically, Daso says, Arnold's most prescient judgment may have been the one that required him to defer action. To separate the Army Air Forces in the midst of a global conflict would have interfered with many other, more critical plans and programs. Long an advocate of an independent air service, Arnold placed his dreams on the back burner until victory was won.

Toward the end of his life, Arnold delineated the three components of what he felt constituted a successful military career. The first prerequisite was basic knowledge: "exact, clear knowledge; not a hazy smattering." Arnold's knowledge of the basics of the military profession was the air chief's "technique" that constituted the tools of the profession. To this knowledge, Arnold added unrelenting hard work—the same puritanical work effort that characterized his years on the Army general staff and within the halls of power in Washington, D.C. Finally, Arnold listed the most important element: *vision*, the key of which was to look beyond an immediate assignment to envision possibilities yet to be developed. It was his ability to conceptualize new hori-

zons of activity that converted Arnold's dreams into realities.

In the final analysis, Daso presents an interesting sketch of America's foremost air commander, and adds significantly to our knowledge of the struggle for parity among the various military services. Though his analysis at times borders on idolatry, Daso achieves his purpose in presenting Arnold as a pioneer who advanced the evolution of American air power. Though *Infantry* readers might enjoy more combat and operational history in this biography, the author reminds us that Arnold fought World War II not in the field, but in Congress, on the Army General Staff, in factories, and in universities.

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***Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On.*** Edited by Brian Bond and Nigel Cave. Leo Cooper, 1999. 271 Pages. \$36.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired.

British Army Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during World War I, has become known as the epitome of the military "butcher and bungler." He remains best known for the unprecedented carnage at the Somme in 1916, where a shocking 60,000 casualties were suffered on the first day of the battle with about a half-million total casualties incurred during the four-and-a-half month operation; and Passchendaele (Third Ypres) the following year, where another 275,000 British casualties were sustained. As a result, Haig's reputation continues to arouse controversy and interest.

Through the ensuing years and the release of relevant documents, less emotional and more detached assessments of Haig's wartime generalship have been made. This superb anthology, edited by Brian Bond and Nigel Cave to mark the 70th anniversary of Haig's death in 1928, consists of 14 essays written primarily by members of the British Commission for Military History and the Douglas Haig Fellowship. As a result, this volume is "unapologetically 'pro-Haig,'" not in terms of demonstrable bias, but "in the sense that the editors and a majority of

contributors believe that [Haig] has been misunderstood, misrepresented and excessively criticized."

This collective reappraisal includes controversial topics and others that illuminate less-known aspects of Haig's career and personality. Haig's relationships with his political masters, military superiors, and Allies—as well as his subordinate commanders (and subsequently with historians)—are chronicled and assessed in detail. Other essays show that, contrary to earlier perceptions, Haig generally supported the development and employment of tanks, various mortars, machineguns, and other technological innovations that would help break the deadlock of trench warfare on the Western Front. Haig's judicious use of punishment in maintaining the discipline of the BEF is the subject of another well-researched chapter. Concluding essays focus on Haig's relationship with his soldiers and his association with the British Legion, and the role of religion in his life.

This interesting volume is revisionary in nature and reappraises many aspects of Haig's generalship and character. The view of Haig that generally emerges from these essays is one of a much more competent and conscientious commander than previously recognized. Near the end of World War I, a young officer remarked that even under the most demanding combat conditions, Haig "managed to convey to every man who served under him his own resolution and singleness of purpose." The achievements and attributes of such a leader are always worthy of study.

***The Western Front: Ordinary Soldiers and the Defining Battles of World War I.* By Richard Holmes. TV Books LLC, 1999. 224 Pages. \$26.00, Hardcover.**

***Verdun.* By David Mason. The Windrush Press, 2000. 202 Pages. \$24.95.** Reviewed by Colonel Christopher B. Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

If you are not familiar with much of the land warfare of World War I, Richard Holmes's work is an excellent primer. Toward the close of the book, he includes a four-page summary, "The War in Outline," which—despite its brevity—relates all major events and key battles from 1914 to the Armistice on 11 November 1918.

If you have more than a passing familiarity with the carnage of the ground conflict in that war, then David Mason's thoroughly well written and readable text will provide a more specific and detailed account of a battle that is now remembered by many for

Marshal Petain's famous declaration: "*Ille ne passerant pas*" (they shall not pass).

As for virtually all other wars, numbers can prove fascinating, and illuminating as well. The length of the Western Front encompassed a stunning linearity over 450 miles long, from the North Sea to the (neutral) Swiss border. More numbers, thrown into the mix, are even more breathtaking: *During the whole war 5,253,538 tons of ammunition were shipped to France, but even this was exceeded by the 5,438,603 tons of fodder for the Army's horses and mules. The [British Expeditionary Force's] animal strength peaked at 449,800 in 1917.* Getting more specific, with respect to Verdun, Mason claims that *In the ten months to December 1916, the French and German armies used an estimated 10,000,000 artillery shells against one another at Verdun. Some 1,350,000 tons of steel were dropped on the narrow battle zone north of the city.* And this shell expenditure was on a front less than 15 miles wide. Finally, the numbers in terms of human life: The Western Front claimed over three-fourths of a million lives, French, German, and British. Verdun, in terms of total casualties (killed, wounded, missing) cost the French more than 378,000 men, the Germans 337,000. Further, what the Germans and French lost in men during the 10 months at Verdun amounted to more than half of all casualties suffered by the British in World War II.

It has been popular to blame the appalling loss of life in World War I on the generals, especially on the Allied side. Severe criticism of German generals by their own men is, at least in English translation, rather hard to come by. Hollywood has been typically hard on English and French generals, especially in films like *Gallipoli* (English indifference to the loss of lives) and *Path of Glory* (a scathing indictment of a French general whose megalomania or paranoia is responsible, not just for the useless slaughter of young infantrymen, but for the arbitrary execution of three soldiers who are accused of cowardice and selected for execution by the random drawing of lots.)

Holmes, however, gives a substantially different and more sympathetic picture of generals and their staffs. Fifty-eight British generals were killed or died of wounds received on the Western Front. Three division commanders were killed at Loos in 1915. Soldiers' respect for their officers extended up through the ranks to division commander (major general). Beyond that, generals were an abstraction; they, and their staffs, could be blamed for anything. Holmes quotes W.N. Nicholson, an officer with divisional

staff experience: "A man can issue orders till he's blue in the face; he can write—and the best of his orders and letters will be criticized. But if he'll come and let his soldiers see him, they'll do anything he asks them."

Mason discusses the French general staff in quite specific terms and fingers Joffre for the failure to recognize Verdun's strategic importance. It was left "under resourced in men and artillery." He would not believe Verdun could be the object of a German offensive. The French general staff time after time launched poorly supported counterattacks to reclaim modest German advances. Again, we see the shortsightedness of generals not at the divisional level but at corps and higher commands.

But as under-resourced as it was, Verdun was still a redoubtable position. Von Falkenhayn had launched the attack to "bleed the French army white." In doing so, the Germans submitted to doctrine rather than reality. Mason quotes Churchill's *The World in Crisis*; the future Prime Minister wrote, "Attack the strongest at his strong point, not the weakest at his weakest point," was once again proclaimed the guiding maxim of German military policy.

Holmes's work is the best book to date on the Western Front. Read it for background and for context. Then, for an excellent account of the most costly battle on that front, read Mason. It will require an investment of time and just over \$50. Both will be richly rewarded.

***The Book of War.* Edited by John Keegan. Viking, 1999. 496 Pages. \$34.95.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

John Keegan is a well-known military historian and prolific writer. In this anthology, he has assembled extracts from 66 previously published histories, memoirs, speeches, and eyewitness accounts, first, "to chronicle the evolution of western warfare" and, second, to demonstrate that all forms of warfare are "essentially inhumane." (All of these writings were previously published except for one. The exception, an extract from a William Dunbar manuscript, is found on pages 99-102.) Each extract is preceded by a historical note prepared by Keegan that puts it in its proper historical setting.

To these 66 narrative extracts, Keegan has added 16 poems, some complete, others not. Only a few have short comments added by Keegan, and these usually appear as brief notes at the end of the poems.

The narrative extracts themselves run the

gamut from the writings of Thucydides to Xenophon, on to Andrew Wheatcroft, James Fremantle, Erwin Rommel, E.L. Spears, John Masters, Ernie Pyle, and end with the Gulf War (1990-91) experiences of Andy McNab (a pseudonym). Among the better known poems, at least to most U.S. readers, are Robert Southey's *The Battle of Blenheim*, Victor Hugo's *Russia 1812*, Alfred, Lord Tennyson's *The Charge of the Light Brigade*, Rudyard Kipling's *Tommy*, John McRae's *In Flanders Fields*, and Siegfried Sassoon's *The Hero*.

Keegan has divided his anthology into three parts, of unequal lengths, although a reader should also read his introduction. Part one, some 23 entries, stretches from the Peloponnesian War (5th century BC) to the battle of Hohenlinden (1800 A.D.). In this opening part, Keegan "is particularly concerned with war between different cultures." I admit that I became confused as I worked my way through these extracts and poems, for I could not understand why the accounts of the battles of Crecy and Agincourt were included, or why Keegan allotted so much space to the American Indians' penchant for torturing and then killing their captives in the most horrible ways. (In a previously published book, *The Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America*, 1995, Keegan delved deeper into this aspect of American Indian life and culture.)

Part two, 17 items—the shortest of the three parts, presents extracts and poems taken largely from British sources. These are concerned with "the warfare of regular armies in the age of established European states: and with "The European impulse to empire." The writings cover the period from the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of World War I, and concentrate on British Army soldiers in combat or preparation for combat in Europe, the Crimea, Africa, and India.

The final section is the longest, with 42 extracts (including poems). These cover the period of time from the outbreak of World War I to the Gulf War. Again, the largest number of extracts are from British sources. They are about evenly divided among World War I, the interwar years, and World War II. Two are from the Vietnam War era, and a third, mentioned earlier is from the Gulf War.

I was also concerned as I read the various extracts and poems at the lack of attention paid to naval and air matters. Keegan does mention these matters, in a limited way, in several of his notes, but I believe these two facets of war deserved more attention.

I was disappointed in the book's overall

thrust. But Keegan did go a long way toward proving his thesis that "all forms of warfare" are "essentially inhumane."

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**North Korean Special Forces. Second Edition). By Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1998. 328 Pages. \$39.95.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley.

Ordinarily, a second edition of a book doesn't get a separate review, other than perhaps a passing comment that a revised edition is available. Book buyers often shy away from buying a second edition, mostly because they don't believe the price is worth the new material. This is especially true if they already own the previous edition.

On occasion, the second edition of a book differs greatly from the previous version, as is the case with Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.'s *North Korean Special Forces*. You could almost make the argument that these are two different books—almost. Obviously the subject matter is the same and the broad discussion, including the historical background, is similar. This new version is so largely expanded that it is practically a new book. Another defense is the publisher; Jane's published the first version of this book, in 1988.

One of the hallmarks of Mr. Bermudez's work is that all of his research is based on open source material. As he points out early in his extensive bibliography, this includes, for this work, both declassified and unclassified U.S. Government publications as well as many books and articles from other sources. Only one, *North Korean News*, appears to be published in North Korea. I mention this to make the point about the difficulty of writing a book without having available a variety of sources from the country being discussed.

The new version is much better than the original, not just because it has more material in it. It is better organized, and covers the subject matter better. *North Korean Special Forces* may seem a bit dry, but it is well worth reading and adding to a library. I recommend this book, not just to military history students but especially to those who focus on the more narrow field of special purpose, special mission organizations.

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**Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970. By Keith W. Nolan. Presidio Press, 2000. 447 Pages. \$29.95, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Keith William Nolan is the combat

chronicler of the Vietnam War. This, his tenth battlefield account, tells the saga of what he calls the last major infantry battle of the Vietnam War. In April 1970, the 101st Airborne established Firebase Ripcord on Hill 927, a remote area just north of the A Shau Valley, an area of contention from the first years of the conflict. The base constituted a dagger pointed at the heart of North Vietnamese control of the valley. After months of careful preparation and encircling the site, the North Vietnamese started shelling the base on July 1, and the siege began. Fierce fighting occurred on the surrounding ridges as well. An annotated map on the body of a dead NVA soldier depicted the forthcoming assault on Ripcord and indicated the overwhelming odds the defenders faced.

At this point in the war, the United States was dedicated, above all else, to minimizing casualties. Firebase Ripcord was ordered evacuated and then destroyed by air strikes. The attempted extrication on July 22 and 23, however, became a disaster as the 101st took heavy casualties in the retreat. During the 23-day siege, the Screaming Eagles lost 74 KIA, 400 WIA, and 13 MIA. Because the Cambodian Incursion was dominating the press and the U.S. banned reporters from Ripcord in the latter stages, the battle attracted little media attention. This gave the 101st the opportunity to minimize the event and indeed to attempt to whitewash the North Vietnamese victory.

Nolan undertook this project both to fill a gap in the historical record of the war and to honor the soldiers who fought courageously at Ripcord. He says that the men who displayed such stunning courage at the ill-fated firebase won "a personal victory inside a larger defeat." He continues that the circumstances of that defeat—including indecision, restraint, and limited effort against the enemy's total commitment—made Ripcord "something of a tragic metaphor for the entire Vietnam War."

Although Nolan may exaggerate the import of this particular engagement, this book is another example of his trademark—gripping battle histories that illuminate the nature of war. This may be his best work to date. Certainly, it won't be his last.

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**A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents, Mostly Rough Sometimes Ready. By James M. Perry. John Wiley, 2000. 305 Pages, Photographs, Maps. \$27.95, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, U.S. Army.

"I am en route to Washington with details of a great battle. We have carried the day." Thus read the headline of the *New York Herald* about the perceived Union success in that seminal foray the day after the first Civil War battle at Bull Run. General William Sherman vilified the *Herald* reporters as "the buzzards of the press." George G. Meade "strapped one of them backward on a mule and rode him out of camp" complete with a sign embellishing him as "Libeler of the Press." In fact, Army commanders on both sides distrusted a free press they could not control. The "scoundrels" in this event are the reporters who roamed the battlefields chasing a story.

The self-proclaimed Bohemian Brigade was a "group of men who tried to make sense of the most dramatic event in American history" and they did it by writing columns in various newspapers for the Union, the Confederacy, and at points abroad. Author James M. Perry writes that the Civil War reporters, to many, were a preposterous, controversial, infuriating, and disarming band of rogues and heroes. Perry, himself a journalist and author of *Arrogant Armies* and recipient of the prestigious Fourth Estate Award, is a modern day version of those who packed the Civil War battlefields and then scurried to send their messages and stories, either in person or by telegraph. This is what makes *A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents* unique; it is written by a son of their own, someone who is well qualified to develop this wonderfully constructed chronicle of those who reported on the war between the states.

From the battlefield of the first encounter at Bull Run came the scouring assembly of news-seekers such as Charles Charleton Coffin, Henry Villard, and Uriah Painter of the North, Peter Alexander and Felix Gregory de Fontaine who worked for Southern papers, and William Howard Russell of the *Times* of London. In this first deployment of the Bohemian Brigade, the results were mixed at best.

As described on the inside cover of the dust-jacket, "much of our understanding of the U.S. Civil War is based upon newspaper dispatches written under horrible battlefield conditions, and journalists' memoirs penned under more reflective moments after the war's end. As a result, modern American journalism emerged from the Civil War, and Perry makes it clear that, thanks to the telegraph and the importance placed on breaking news and scoops, the conflict was the first instant-news event. It was a time of sending messages using 'the lightning' or the telegraph."

Perry draws upon his experience as a newspaperman to show, for better or worse, that for the most part, these reporters put their lives at risk on the battlefield, and he brings each reporter, "rogues and heroes alike," to life in this wonderfully crafted book. There is no doubt they were pompous, arrogant, and highly inventive, that they lied and cheated, got the story wrong more often than they should have, and drank too much. By his own admission, Perry claims that, "They did a lot of things reporters are still doing today."

But Perry admits that, for all their faults, these were correspondents who endured Civil War prisons, battlefield skirmishes, and intense colleague competition to get the story to print. In short, it is wonderfully readable narrative worthy of revealing the historical significance of the battlefield reporter.

## RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

*The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations.* Edited by Peter G. Tsouras. Stackpole, 2000. 600 Pages. \$49.95.

*Cambrai: The Right Hook Hindenburg Line.* By Jock Harsfall and Nigel Cave. Leo Cooper, 1999. 176 Pages, photos. \$16.95.

*The British Army: A Pocket Guide 2000-2001.* By Charles Heyman. Leo Cooper, 2000. 185 Pages. \$9.95.

*Rifleman: Elite Soldiers of the War Against Napoleon.* By Philipp Elliot-Wright. Publishing News Ltd., 2000. 144 Pages (large format, b&w and color art). \$34.95.

*Highlander: Fearless Celtic Warriors.* By Stuart Reid. Publishing News Ltd., 2000. 144 Pages (b&w and color illustrations). \$34.95.

*Fire & Ice: The Korean Conflict 1950-1953.* By Michael Varhola. Stackpole Books, 2000. 240 Pages, maps, photos. \$24.95.

*Silent Warrior: The Marine Sniper's Story Continues.* By Charles W. Henderson. Berkley Books, 2000. 302 Pages. \$21.95.

*World War II in Photographs.* By Richard Holmes. Carlton (4720 Boston Way, Lanham, MD 20706), 2000. 400 Pages, more than 500 photographs. \$50.00.

*How They Won the War in the Pacific: Nimitz and His Admirals.* Lyons Press, 2000. By Edwin P. Hoyt. 558 Pages. \$24.95, Softbound.

*John Glenn: A Memoir.* By John Glenn with Nick Taylor. Bantam Books, 2000. 560 Pages. \$7.99.

*Allied Special Forces Insignia 1939-1948.* By Peter Taylor. Combined Publishing, 2000. 220 Pages. \$39.95.

*Monchy le Preux: Arras.* Battleground Europe Series. By Colin Fox. Combined Publishing, 2000. 160 Pages. \$16.95.

*Mons 1914.* Battleground Europe Series. By Jack Harsfall and Nigel Cave. Combined Publishing, 2000. 192 Pages. \$16.95.

*El Alamein.* By Michael Carver (Field Marshal Lord Carver). First published 1962. Combined Publishing, 2000. 215 Pages. \$12.99.

*Hannibal.* By Ernle Bradford. First published 1981. Combined Publishing, 2000. 238 Pages. \$12.99.

*SAS: Special Forces in Action.* Military Illustrated. By Stephen Bull. Edited by Tim Newark. Color Plates by Richard Hook. Combined Publishing, 144 Pages. \$34.95.

*Bloody Aachen.* The West Wall Series, Volume 3. By Charles Whiting. Combined Publishing, 2000. 155 Pages. \$27.95.

*Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Code-breaking in World War II.* By Stephen Budiansky. The Free Press, 2000. 43 Pages. \$27.50.

*The Genius of Robert E. Lee: Leadership Lessons for the Outgunned, Outnumbered, and Underfinanced.* By Al Kaltman. Prentice Hall, 2001. 264 Pages. \$24.00.

*Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals, 1939 to Present.* Fifth edition. By Colonel Frank Foster and Lawrence Borts. Stackpole, 2000. 144 Pages. \$24.95, Softbound.

*Shadow Flights: America's Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union.* By Curtis Peebles. Presidio, 2000. 352 Pages, photos. \$27.95.

*Into the Shadows Furious: The Brutal Battle for New Georgia.* By Brian Altobello. Presidio, 2000. 432 Pages, maps, photos. \$29.95, Hardcover.

*Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916-2000.* By Kenneth W. Estes. Naval Institute Press, 2000. 283 Pages.

*The Double-Cross System.* By J.C. Masterman. Lyons Press, 2000. 224 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

*A Man Called Intrepid.* By William Stevenson. First published 1976. Lyons Press, 2000. 512 Pages. \$18.95, Softbound.

*The New Art of the Leader.* By William A. Cohen. Prentice Hall, 2000. 314 Pages. \$23.00, Hardcover.

*Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher.* By Malham M. Wakin. Lexington Books (4720 Boston Way, Lanham, MD 20706), 2000. 192 Pages. \$60.00.

*War in the Modern World.* By Theodore Ropp. First published by Duke University Press, 1959. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 424 Pages.

*Currahee!* By Donald R. Burgett. First published 1967. Dell Books, 2000. 256 Pages. \$6.50.

*Combat Service Support Guide.* Third edition. Stackpole, 2000. 288 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.

*Bloody Ridge: The Battle that Saved Guadalcanal.* By Michael S. Smith. Presidio, 2000. 240 Pages, maps, photos. \$24.95, Hardcover.

*MacArthur Strikes Back: Decision at Buna: New Guinea 1942-1943.* By Harry Gailey. Presidio, 2000. 272 Pages, maps, photos. \$27.95, Hardcover.

*The Book of War: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing.* By John Keegan. Penguin, 2000. 512 Pages. \$17.00, Softbound.

*Jack Lewes: Co-founder of the SAS.* By John Lewes. Leo Cooper, 2000. 266 Pages. \$34.95.

*Battle Stations: Decisive Weapons of the Second World War.* By Taylor Downing and Andrew Johnston. Leo Cooper, 2000. 237 Pages, photos. \$29.95.

*Battle for the Central Highlands: A Special Forces Story.* By George E. Dooley. Ballantine Books, 2000. 274 Pages. \$6.99.